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THE NATURE OF THE INTEREST OF THE GRANTEE
UNDER AN OIL AND GAS LEASE

By JAAIES W. SIMONTON"
The discovery and development of vast deposits of natural gas
and petroleum of almost fabulous value, has gven rise to legal
problems which differ in some respects from any that have heretofore come before the courts for solution. In dealing with cases
involving these unfamiliar minerals, the courts naturally resorted
to those analogous situations found in the law which seemed to them
most nearly applicable. The application of several different analogies to the same problems arising in oil and gas cases by the
courts of different states has led to a considerable amount of confusion. One of the first questions which presented difficulties was
as to the nature of a landowner's property in oil and gas in place
beneath his land. This question is now fairly well settled, though
the courts of all the states are not in accord.' A second and equally difficult question is as to the nature of the interest in land which
passes to a grantee or lessee under an oil and gas lease. As to this
question the authorities are in a state of great confusion and uncertainty. In the present paper this latter question will be discussed and the nature of the interest which passes to the lessee will
,be considered. The instruments which are almost universally known
as oil and gas leases will be so termed in this paper, though it is
unfortunate that they are not known by some more fitting name
since they are not in fact leases, though they are sufficiently analogous to lead some courts to assume them to be true leases.
Oil and gas are found beneath the surface of the earth in pools
or reservoirs, irregular in size and shape, and located in strata of
porous rock or sand. The depth of these oil and gas bearing strata
may be from a few hundred to many thousand feet. At some
places there are several of such strata at various depths and having no apparent connection with one another. It is by no means
impossible that pools of oil or gas may some day be found at
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
'For a good discussion uf this question see an article by Mr. John Stokes Adams
entitled, "The Right of a Landowner to Oil and Gas in His Land," 63 PA. LAW
Rv. 471.
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depths to which the genius of man has, as yet, been unable to penetrate, and that landowners in fields that are now supposed to be
exhausted, may some day find themselves possessed of new fortunes
flowing from what are at present inaccessible depths.
As a foundation for any intelligent discussion of the problems
under consideration, it is necessary to state briefly the law as to
the nature of the landowner's interest in the oil and gas while in
place beneath the surface of the land. One of the minerals being
gaseous and the other liquid, naturally an attempt was made to
apply the settled principles of law applicable to percolating waters,
since such waters, like oil and gas, are in strata beneath the surface and capable of flowing from place to place. .These principles,
however, proved to be inapplicable in some respects to petroleum
and natural gas. For example, even under the more progressive
decisions in this country as to percolating waters, a landowner has
no right to collect subterranean waters for the purpose of merchandise, if by so doing, he seriously damages his neighbors' use of
such waters, 2 while the whole purpose of oil and gas production
is to secure the minerals for the purpose of selling them. It is
apparent that the existing law as to solid stratified minerals, such
as coal, could not logically be applied to petroleum and natural
gas, for like percolating waters, these new minerals are fugitive in
nature and capable of passing from place to place, so that a single
well near a boundary line might drain oil and gas from a large area
of land much of which belongs to strangers. It was also suggested
that these minerals were like animals ferae naturae in that they
were fugitive and capable of escaping from the land at one locality
and passing to other land. The principles finally applied by the
majority of the courts are in a measure a combination of principles
of law taken from these various analogies.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Westmoreland Natural
Gas Company v. DeWitt,3 a very influential case on this point, after
comparing oil and gas in place in the land to percolating waters
and more particularly to animals ferae naturae, expressed its opinion in the following language:
"They [oil and gas] belong to the owner of the land so long
as they are in it or on it, and are subject to his control; but
when they escape, and go into other land, or come under an2See FARNHAM,

WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, §938; 53 L. R. A. (N.

'130 Pa. St. 235,

S.)

369 note.

S 'At. 724 (1889).
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other's control, the title of the former owner is gone. If an
adjoining or even a distant owner, drills on his own land, and
takes your gas so that it comes into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours but his. And equally so as between
lessor and lessee in the present case, the one who controls the
gas, has it in his grasp so to speak, is the one who has possession in the legal as well as in the ordinary sense of the
word.
"Tested by these principles, there is not the slightest doubt
that the possession of the gas, as well as the right to it under
this lease, was in the complainants when the bill was filed.
They had put down a well, which had tapped the gas bearing
strata, and it was the only one on the land. They had it in
their control, for they had only to turn a valve to have it flow
into their pipe, ready for use."
While the meaning of the above language is not clear, it would
seem that the idea of the court was that the owner of land, after
drilling a well and tapping a gas bearing stratum, has title to all
the gas in such stratum which happens to be underneath his land
at the time. Likewise, if he taps oil bearing rock or sand, he
thereby acquires title to all the oil therein. Such title, if it exists, must necessarily be a qualified title since it may be lost by the
escape of the oil or gas into other land. The court said the oil and
gas belong to the owner of the land, "so long as they are in it or
on it, and subject to his control." What is meant by the clause
"and subject to his control"? It might be admitted that if an oil
or gas bearing stratum be tapped by a well on a particular tract of
land, the owner of that land does have a measure of control over
some of the gas under the surface, but such control is very slight,
except as to the oil or gas either very near the well or actually in it.
If an adjoining owner has a well near the boundary line he will
have a greater degree of control over a part of the minerals than
has the owner of the land. Of course, under the language of the
above case, the owner would have no title to oil or gas in deeper
strata not yet tapped by any well. The idea of a qualified ownership of the oil and gas in place as suggested in the above case is
not only illogical but is inconsistent with the principles of the law
of real property. It leads to the absurdity of holding that a man
has title to valuable property which the courts will not protect.
As was said by Ar. Justice White in Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana:'
'177 U. S. 190 (1899).
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"But it cannot be that property to a specified thing vests
in one who has no right to prevent any other person from
taking or destroying the object which is asserted to be the
subject of the right of property."
The doctrine of a qualified ownership in oil and gas in place
after discovery, as expressed in Westmoreland Natural Gas Company v. DeWitt, it seems, has not been followed by subsequent
Pennsylvania cases,' but the language used in that decision has
often been quoted or its substance stated by other courts.0 Some
of these courts have mis-stated the language so as to convey the
idea that after discovery the owner has title to all the oil and gas
under his land though in a stratum not yet tapped by any well.7
Apparently some of the courts which quote the above language of
the Pennsylvania court have not given the matter careful consideration and in a case where the point were important probably
would not give effect to the language used. Nevertheless, there is
a certain amount of confusion which has grown out of the idea of
a qualified title in oil and gas in place as expressed in the above case.
A more logical conclusion as to the nature of a landowner's property right in the oil and gas in place, and one more consistent with
established principles of the law of property, is that expressed by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Ohio Oil Company v.
Indiana.' In this case the court called attention to the fact that
the analogy drawn as to animals ferae naturaefailed in an important particular, namely, that title to wild animals is in the public
and the public may prohibit an individual from taking them even
on his own land, while oil and gas are confined in local reservoirs
and the public has no property in them. The court concluded
that the landowner has no property interest in the oil and gas
which may be beneath the surface of his land, and can acquire no
5Kelly v.

Keys,

213 Pa. St. 295, 62 Atl.

911

(1905); Duffield

vi. Hue, 129 Pa.

St. 94, 18 At. 566 (1889) and 136 Pa. St. 602, 20 Atl. 526 (1890).
But see
Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. St. 338, 74: Atl. 207 (1909) where the court
apparently holds that the landowner owns all the oil and gas under his land even
though no wells

have been drilled.

GBrown v. Spillman, 155 U. S. 665 (1895);

Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 14G

Fed. 801, 809 (1905) ; Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 103 JArk. 175,
146 S. W. 122 (3912) ; Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 40-,(1909) ; Heller V.
Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N. E. 490 (1902); Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas

Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106 Pac. 47 (1910) ; Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 0178, 62
So. 623 (1913) ; Northwest Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 0. St. '259, 67 N.
E. 494 (1903).
7Brown v. Spillman, 155 1U. S. 665 (1895).
8177 U. S. 190 (1899).
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title to them until he reduces them to possession. He has the exelusive right within the boundaries of his own land to sink wells
in search of these minerals, and if he finds them, to take all he is
able to secure, even though adjoining lands are completely drained.
There is no limit on the extent to which he may exercise this
right to take oil and gas, except perhaps, that he can be restrained
from unreasonable waste of the minerals. Under this doctrine the
owner of the land on which there are producing wells, would have
no greater property right in oil and gas which has not yet come into
his wells, than he had before such wells were drilled. It is submitted that this is the only reasonable theory as to the owner's
property right to petroleum and natural gas in place. Any other
view seems impossible to reconcile with established principles of
the law and particularly with very many existing decisions in connection with the production of oil and gas under oil and gas
leases. The doctrine of Ohio Oil Company v. hvdiana is now the
law in most of the oil and gas producing states,9 though there is
still some uncertainty due to the doctrine of qualified ownership
after discovery, expressed in Westmoreland Natural Gas Company
v. DeWitt.
In West Virginia the courts have come to an entirely different
conclusion as to the nature of the owner's property right in oil
and gas in place. They hold that since oil and gas are minerals
found in strata beneath the surface, they should be treated like
solid stratified minerals, such as coal, in so far as property rights
in them are concerned. Therefore an owner has title to the oil
and gas in place nider his land, and the ownership of such minerals may be severed from that of the rest of the land, just as the
Ownership of a vein of coal may be severed by conveyance from
that of the soil.10 This doctrine is open to all the objections that
would apply to a qualified ownership in oil and gas in place such
as suggested in Westmoreland Natural Gas Company v. DeWitt.
0
Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S. W. 122
(1912) ; Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53 (1908) ; Wew
American Oil & Mining Co. v. Troyer, 166 Ind. 402, 77 N. U. 739 (1906) ; Manufacturers Oil and Gas Co. v. Indiana Oil and Gas Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57 N,-,E. 912 (1900)
Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S. iW. 368 (1903)
Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N. Y. 505, 62 N. E. 584 (1902) ; Shepard v. McCalmont
Oil Co., 38 Hun (N. Y.) 37 (1885); Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, 110
Pac. 902 (1910).
1OCoffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 74 W. Va. 107, 81 S. B. 966 '(1914)
South Penn Oil Co. v. Haught, 71 W. Va. 720, 78 S. E. 759 '(1913); Kiser v.
McLean, 67 W. Va. 294. 67 S. E. 725 (1910); Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278,
50 S. E. 236 (1905) ; Wilson v. Youst, 43 'W. Va. 826, 28 S. fN. 781 (1897).
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In fact there can be no more than a qualified title to oil and gas in
place in West Virginia, for the West Virginia court recognizes the
fugitive character of these minerals and admits that title may be
lost to a landowner by their escape to other land." The West
Virginia court has rendered decisions inconsistent with this doctrine, and has gone even so far as to disregard it entirely in a case
where it seemed particulary troublesome, 2 but nevertheless it must
be regarded as the settled law of the state. The courts of Kansas
have followed those of West Virginia, so that in these two states
the matter is settled contra to the law most of the other states
which have passed on the question. 3
MAost of the petroleum and natural gas produced in this country is produced under instruments called oil and gas leases. An
instrument of this character usually gives to the grantee or lessee
the right to search for oil and gas on certain described premises
:for a definite term of years and so long thereafter as oil or gas is
Xound in paying quantities. The owner is usually given a share of
the oil produced as royalty and, if gas is found, a certain annual
sum is paid to him for each producing well. As these instruments
14
are construed by the courts, it is inaccurate to term them leases,
but since they are universally called oil and gas leases they will
be so designated in this discussion. Before proceeding with the
discussion as to the nature of the interest which passes to the
lessee under an oil and gas lease, it may be well to give a brief
preliminary statement as to the construction which the courts put
upon the ordinary form of oil and gas lease.' 5
"See cases cited in preceding note.
"Hall -v. Vernon, 47 W. Va. 295, 34 S. U. 764 (1899).
See also Campbell v.
!Lynch, 94 S. E. 739 (W. Va. 1918).
13Mound City Brick & Gas Co. v. Goodspeed Oil & Gas Co., 83 Kan. 136, 109 Pac.
1002 (1910) ; Moore v. Griffin, 72 Kan. 164, 83 Pac. 395 (1905),
By way of dictum
a similar opinion is expressed by the Supreme Court of Texas in Texas Co. v.
Daugherty, 176 S. W. 717 (1915).
See also Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225
Pa. St. 338, 74 AtI. 207 (1909).
4
" See note in 31 HAM. L. REv. 882. See also Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140
Fed. 801 (1905) ; New American Oil & Mining Co. v. Troyer, 166 Ind. 402, 77 f. E.
739 (1906) ; Stahl v. Illinois Oil Co., 45 Ind. App. 211, 90 N.
. 632 (1910);
Dickey v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick Co., 69 Kan. 106, 76 Pac. 398 (1904) ; Cooke V.
Gulf Refining Co., 135 La. 609, 65 So. 758 (1914); Eaton v. Allegheny Gas Co.,
122 N. Y. 419, 25 N. E. 981 (1890) ; Smith v. Root, 66 W. Va. 633, 66 S. B. 1005
(1910) ; Lawson v. Kirchner, 50 W. Va. 344, '40 S. B. 344 (1901) ; Eclipse Oil Co. v.
:South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 84, 34 S. S. 923 (1899).
"While oil and gas Jeases vary greatly in language, as to the granting portion
,they all are made for the purpose of permitting the development of the land for oil
a nd gas by the lessee, and, taken as a whole, grant to the lessee the right to entei
-and drill for oil and gas and to take them it found.
Hence in so far as the
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By its language such an instrument purports to lease the right
to explore for and produce oil and gas for a period of years, and
as long thereafter as oil or gas can be produced in paying quantities. This grant of the right to search for oil and gas and to produce them if found is in all oil and gas leases. It would seem to
be a grant to the grantee or lessee of the owner's right to the oil
and gas, whatever its nature, for a period of years. Therefore, it
ought to pass to the grantee some sort of a legal interest in the
land. This interest must necessarily be only an incorporeal interest in states where the landowner does not own the oil and gas in
place,' 6 for the lessee does not get possession of the surface of the
land, except in so far as is necessary to carry out the purpose of
the lease, namely, to explore for and produce oil and gas, the
right to possession being merely an easement. In West Virginia
and Kansas where the landowner is held to have title to the oil and
gas beneath the surface it is nevertheless established law that a
lessee under an oil and gas lease gets only an incorporeal interest
in the land. though the courts of these states might plausibly have
held the contrary.
It has been held that the grantee or lessee under an oil and gas
lease gets no vested estate in the land until he enters on the land
and actually discovers oil or gas. Upon such discovery an estate
in the land vests in him for the first time. 8 On principle it seems
erroneous to say such grantee or lessee has no vested interest of
any sort in the land prior to discovery, for, if so, then the grantor
could refuse to permit him to enter, without other penalty than a
liability at law for damages for breach of contract. The nature of
the interest which passes to the lessee under the lease as construed
by the courts will be discussed in detail in a later part of the
paper. At present it will suffice to point out that, according to the
problem here nnder discussion is concerned the difference in language usually affects
the quantity but not the general nature of the lessee's interest in the land.
6
See cases cited In note 9, supra.
7
2 Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S. E. 12 (1916) ; South I'enn
Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961 -(1912); Eastern Oil Co. v.
Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909); Toothman v. Courtney, 62 W. Va.
167, 58 S. E. 915 (1907) ; Beardsley v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 78 Kan. 571, 96
Pac. 859 (1908) : Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 75 Kan. 335,
89 Pac. 750 (1907).
See also Pierce-Fordyce Oil Co. v. Woodrum, 188 S. W. 245
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
5
' Apparently the first case In which an oil and gas lease was so construed waq
Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. St. 451, 25 Atl. 732 (1893).
The doctrine ha;
spread rapidly and today nearly all oil and gas leases 'are so construed. The question as to whether such construction of these instruments can be justified will be
discussed at a subsequent place In this article.
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great weight of authority, the grantee or lessee under such a lease
gets either no interest or a very limited interest in The land before the discovery of oil or gas, and that upon discovery, some kind
of a new estate in the land vests in him. 9
It is said that the law will not permit the creation of new forms
of estates in real property. 2 Therefore any estate which may pass
to a grantee or lessee under an oil and gas lease must necessarily
be some kind of an estate in land already known to the law. Courts
have not attempted the invention of any new kind of estate but
have too frequently misnamed the estate which passed under an oil
and gas lease. What interests in land might possibly be created by
an instrument which purports to grant for a limited term the right
to explore for oil and gas and to produce them if found? The possibilities appear to be no more than three in number-a license, a
profit and a leasehold. There is much doubt as to whether or not
a licensee has any interest in land. Without discussing this mooted
question, we will assume that a licensee may have some sort of an
interest in land.
We will now proceed to discuss in order the possibilities of the
forms of oil and gas leases, as construed by the courts, passing to
the grantees or lessees (1) licenses, (2) profits and (3) leaseholds.
I. LICENSES
The word license is often loosely and inaccurately -used by the
courts. As Professor Hohfeld says in a recent article:"- "Like
the term 'res gesta' and 'estoppel,' 'license' may be said to be a
word of convenient and seductive obscurity."
The truth of this
statement is nowhere more apparent than in the cases dealing with
the various kinds of mining interests. So general has been the
misuse of this term that in some states the common-law meaning
of the word seems to have been lost.2 2 If it seems desirable to hold
5

" Thls has been repeatedly stated by the courts of nearly all the oil and gas producing states.

See the cases cited in notes '12 and 13, supra.

RJohnson v. Whiton, 159 Mass. 424, 34 N. E. 542 (1893); Doebler's Appeal, 64
Pa. St. 9

(1869).

See WASHRURN,

THE A.mERCAN

LAW OF REAL PROPERTY,

6 ed.,

§143.
=See 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL 66, 92.

=Sllsby v. Trotter, 29 N. J. Eq. 228 (1878) ; East Jersey Co. v. Wright, 32 N. T.
Eq. 248 (1880) ; Thompson's Appeal, 101 Pa. St. 225 (1882) ; Dark v. Johnson, 55
Pa. St. 164 (1867) ; Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 397 (1869).
In TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 746, it is said: "Frequently the term 'license' Is applied to all rights to take minerals, although created by instruments sufficient for
the conveyance of an incorporeal interest in land, and intended to have such effect,
the term being in fact used merely to distinguish such grant of a right to mine from
a grant of the mineral in place." This 'Is probably true in some cases but certainly
not in all of them. For example see Dark v. Johnson, suprao
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an incorporeal mining right to be irrevocable, the words "coupled
-with an interest" seem to flow from the judicial pen almost unconsciously. Even an easement has been held to be a license
coupled with an interest.23 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in one case used the term license and profit a prendre as interchangeable terms, holding that the license or profit a prendre in
that case was an incorporeal freehold interest in land. 24 But in
many of the oil and gas cases in which the interest of the lessee is
called a license, the language of the opinion seems to indicate considerable doubt in the judicial mind as to the correctness of the
term used. There is some hope that courts at some time in the
future will confine the meaning of this term within proper limits.
It would seem that an incorporeal mining right might properly be
termed a profit2 but our courts appear to be unfamiliar with the
nature of this interest in land and consequently are reluctant to
apply the term to a mining right. Because of the inaccuracy in
the use of the term license, it will be necessary to state the common-law significance of the word and throughout the paper to
confine its meaning to its common-law limits. It may make little
difference to the litigants whether a right is called a license or a
profit, but misuse of such terms means an undesirable lack of
clearness of judicia" expression.
At common law a license is a mere permission to go upon landa justification for trespass-revocable at any time by the licensor.
In Bouvier's Law Dictionary it is defined as:
"A mere permission to do some act or series of acts on the
land of the licensor, without having any permaneit interest
in it; it is founded on personal confidence, and not assignable.
It may be given in writing or by parol; it may be with 'or
without consideration, but in either case it is usually subject
to revocation, though constituting a protection to the party
acting under it until the revocation takes place."
In Wood v. Leadbitter, 6 which is recognized as a leading case on
the subject by the courts in this country, the court says:
"A mere license is revocable; but that which is called a
license is often something more than a license; it often com3Penmant v. Jones, 256 -Pa. St. 416, 100 At. 1043 (1917).
24Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. St. 229 (1866).
2 Whether it is a profit is discussed in a subsequent part -of this paper.
213 M. & W. 838 (1845).
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prises or is connected with a grant, and then the party who
has given it cannot in general revoke it, so as to defeat his
grant to which it was incident.
"It may further be observed, that a license under seal (provided it be a mere license) is as revocable as a license by parol; and, on the other hand, a license by parol, coupled with
a grant, is as irrevocable as a license by deed, coupled with a
grant, provided only that the grant is of a nature capable of
being made by parol. But where there is a license by parol,
coupled with a parol grant, or pretended grant, of something
which is incapable of being granted otherwise than by deed,
there the license is a mere license; it is not incident to a valid
grant, and is therefore revocable."
From the above language it appears that a mere license to go on
land is revocable, whether given by parol or by an instrument
under seal; that if a valid parol grant be made of anything on the
land, then there is a license, implied if not express, to go on the
land to enjoy the grant, and such licenses are irrevocable, because
the grantor will not be permitted thus to defeat his grant; if there
be an attempted parol grant of an interest which can only be
granted by deed then such invalid grant amounts to a license-a
permission to go on the land. Practically all interests in land,
with the exception of some short term leases, must now be granted
either by deed or by an instrument in writing. Hence a parol
grant of any interest in land, except a short term lease, is usually
invalid. But a parol grant of title to chattels on land is valid,
so that most of the cases involving a license coupled with an interest are cases where the interest granted is an interest in a chattel on the land. This is the only proper kind of license coupled
with an interest.17 As will appear below, a right to enter on land
which is coupled with a grant of an interest in land is not a license.
Suppose there is a valid grant of a right to mine coal or to cut
timber on land, the coal severed or the logs cut to be the property
of the grantee-a grant of an estate in the land. If the grantee
severs coal or timber from the land, title to the coal or logs severed
passes to him and he then has a right to remove such chattels from
the land. This right seems to be similar to a license coupled with
a right in a chattel on the land, which chattel the licensee has a
right to remove. In the case supposed, the grantee has a right to
"It seems that at common law the expression "license coupied with an interest!,
is limited to the right which the owner of an interest in a dhattel on land has to
enter on the land and .vemove such chattel. See TIFvANY, REAL PROPERTY, 682-684;
WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY, 6 ed., § 847.
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mine coal and to carry it away or to cut timber and to remove the
logs, and it is necessary for him to go upon the land to accomplish
such acts. These rights to go on the land and do the acts necessary
to enjoyment of the grant are necessarily incident to the grant,
but are they licenses which are irrevocable because coupled with
the grant of an interest in the land, or, are they easements? It is
submitted that such rights cannot be licenses, because they are interests in the land which arise as incident to the grant of the profit
in the land and will continue as long as the profit continues. This
cannot be said of a license coupled with an interest in a chattel
on the land, for it will continue only for a reasonable time.28 The
right suggested above is an easement appurtenant to the profit in
the land. True, it is appurtenant to an incorporeal estate in land,
and it has been said that an incorporeal estate cannot be appurtenant to an incorporeal estate. This, however, it is submitted, cannot be true on principle and is unsupported by direct decision. 29
In the case of a grant of coal in place the grantee has a right to
go on the land and open mines and do whatever else is reasonably
necessary to secure the coal.2 0 Where a mere right to mine coal is
granted, instead of title to the coal in place, the grantee would also
have a right to go on the land and do those things reasonably necesLAWV OF REAL PROPERs.Y, 6 ed., § 847.
In CoKE ON LITTLETON, 121 b, it is stated concerning things appendant and appurtenant: "First, that prescription (which regularly is the mother thereof) doth
not make anything apnendant or appurtenant, unless the thing appendant or appurtenant agree in quality or nature to the thing whereunto -it is appendant or appurtenant; as a thing corporeall cannot be properly appendant to a thing corporeall,
nor a thing incorporeall to a thing incorporeall." The latter portion of the language
quoted has apparently been accepted at its face value by Mr. Jones in his book on
Easements and by several courts in this country. See JONES, THE LAW OF EASEU-ENTS, §§18, 19; Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 53; Leonard v. White, 7 Mass. 8; Donnell v. Humphreys, I Mont. 509. In Hargrave and Butler's notes to CoKE'S INSTTUTEs in speaking of the above quoted language it is said: "This is not universally
true. It sometimes fails as to things appurtenant. Return of writs or a leet may be
appurtenant to an hundred; so may waif and stray to a leet; and yet in these instances both subjects are incorporeal .........
The true test seems to be, the propriety of relation between the principal and the adjunct; which may be found out by
considering whether they so agree in nature and quality, as to be capable of union
III COKE ON LITTLETON, Hargrave and Butler's Ed.,
without any incongruity."
Note 175. The decisions in the first two 'cases above are to the 'effect that land
cannot be appurtenant to land. The Montana case holds that a right to a ditch
cannot pass as appurtenant to a conveyance of a right to another ditch. These
vases would then fall within the test laid down in the last quotation above, as being
estates incapable of union without incongruity. On 'the other hand, a profit and an
easement are just as clearly capable of such union or connection as is a corporeal
estate in land and an easement.
oWilliams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350 (1888,); Marvin v. Brewster Iron
Mining Co., 55 N. Y. 53S (1874) ; Wardell 'v. Watson, 93 Mo. 107, 5 S. W. 605
(1887) ; Northrup v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S. W. 220 (1916).
"-WASHBURN, TnE AMEmcIAN

2
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sary to enable him to secure the coal."' There is no possible distinction between these cases as to the nature of the grantee's right to
possession and use of the surface except that the principal estate to
which such right is incident in one case is corporeal and in the
other incorporeal. Hence it would seem that there can be no
license coupled with a grant of a profit in land, but that the
32
rights of user connected with a profit are easements.
Suppose there is an attempt to grant a right by parol to mine
coal and carry it away, or to cut timber and remove the logs, such
attempted grant will fail as a grant because not by deed, but will
amount to a license to go on the land and mine coal or cut trees. 3
This right being a mere license is revocable. If before revocation,
the licensee mines coal which is still on the land, or cuts trees and
the logs have not been removed, then there will be the so-called
license coupled with a grant of chattels on the land and this will
be irrevocable but must be exercised within a reasonable time. It
would be better if this implied right were not termed a license at
all and the meaning of the term license, were confined to a mere
revocable permission to go on the land.
But though this implied
right is somewhat illogically called a license coupled with an interest, it cannot with precision be said that a right to use land
which passes as incident to a grant of a valid incorporeal estate
therein is a license coupled with an interest. Such right to use
land has every element of an easement and should be so designated .1'
From the above it appears there can be no case involving a true
"Ingle v. Bottoms, 160 Ind. 73, 66 N. E. 160 (1903); Ewing v. Sandoval Coal
and Mining Co., 110 Ill.290 (1884) : see also numerous cases collected in the note
in 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) '883.
-See Westmoreland Natural Gas Company v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. St. 235, 18 AtI.
724 (18879) ; Union Petroleum Co. v. Bliven, 72 Pa. St. 173 (1872) ; Coffindaffer v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 74 AV. Va. 107, 81 S. E. 966 (1914).
By weight of authority any person, otherwise legally qualified, can create an easement within the

bounds of his oin estate even though such estate
Gayford v. Moffatt, L. R. 4 Ch. App. IS& (1868)
30 N. H. 434 (1855) (dictum) ; Newhoff V. Mayo,
f1891) ; Reimer v. Stuber, 20 Pa. St. 458 (1853)
Pa. St. 206 (1866).

be merely an estate for years.
(dictum) ; Wallace V. Fletcher,
48 N. J. Eq. 619, 23 Atl. r165
(dictum) ; Huff v. ?McCauley, 53

=By weight of authority an oral contract Tor the sale of standing timbe- is void

because within the Statute of Frauds. However, the purchaser under such oral contract has a license to enter and cut timber land title to the timber cut before revocation of the license passes to him. See cases collected in 19 L. R. A. 721 and
47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 877.
"It is unfortunate that this right was ever termed a license coupled with an
interest. It seems inconsistent with the idea that a license is a mere permission
to go upon land, sufficient to excuse trespass while in force, but revocable at the
-will of the licensor.
3See note 32, supra.
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license to produce oil and gas unless there was at the beginning a
mere revocable permission to search for and produce the minerals.
If a landowner should give to A oral permission to come on the
land and explore for oil and gas and to take them as his own if
found, this would give A a mere license to do the acts specified.
Such license could be revoked at any time. Suppose A should enter
on the land and drill a well and should discover oil in Saying quantities. The license would still be revocable, and if then revoked, A
would no longer have any right to produce oil from the well, but
would have the right to go on the land for the purpose of removing
any oil already produced, which might still be on the land. As
to such oil he would have a license coupled with an interest in a
chattel on the land. In those states where Rerick v. Kern" is law,
it is probable the courts would hold that since A had expended a
large sum of money in drilling the well, the landowner could not
revoke the license, thus giving to A a profit in the land."
Suppose the landowner orally agrees that A, for a period of
years, may have permission to go on the land and search for and
produce oil and gas, and A in return promises to give to the landowner a share of any oil or gas that may be produced. There would
now be an oral contract between the parties, which is unenforceable
because within the Statute of Frauds, since it is the apparent intent
of the parties to create a profit. A has at least a license to enter
and drill for oil. If he should drill a well under such an oral contract then he could probably specifically enforce the contract in
equity, because it would be so far performed that a court of equity
would grant specific performance under the doctrine of part performance.3 8 By enforcing such contract A would acquire a profit
in the land. If the contract above mentioned were in writing instead of oral, it would be specifically enforceable in equity, and A
would have an equitable estate in the land. He would have the
right to a conveyance of a profit in the land. If such conveyance
were made, as incident to this profit, he would have the right to
3614 S. & R. (Pa.) 267 (1826).
See Dark v. Johnson, 55 Pa. St. 164 (1867) where the, doctrine of Rerick v.
Kern was applied to what the court termed a license though the interest involved
was plainly more than a license.
'A parol contract for the sale of land will be specifically enforced where there
has been a certain degree of performance. Likewise there is considerable authority
to the effect that equity will specifically enforce an oral contract to grant an easement where there has been part performance of the contract. See cases collected
in 36 Cyc. 685. There is no reason why the same principle should not apply to an
oral contract to grant a profit in land if there has been a sufficient degree of part
1erformance. See Hosford v. Metcalf, 113 Iowa 240, 84 N. W. 1054 (1901).
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enter on the land and drill wells in search for oil and gas and'
could occupy so much of the surface as would be reasonably necessary to enable him to make effective search for oil and gas. If he
should find oil or gas, then he would have a right to occupy so
much of the land as should be reasonably necessary to produce
it and to transport the severed product.3 9 These incidental rights&
to use the land would be easements appurtenant to the profit.
It is possible, but not probable, that a case may arise where therehas been actual production of oil or gas under a mere permission
without consideration. Such cases have arisen in connection with
the mining of solid minerals4 ° but apparently there have been
none involving oil and gas production. If there is a contractwhich satisfies the Statute of Frauds it will ordinarily be specifically enforceable and therefore will create an estate in land amounting to more than a license. Is there then any way in whici cases
involving a mere license to search for and produce oil and gas
have actually arisen? It seems that the only cases where the right
involved at all resembles a license are those where the contractis in writing and under seal but for some reason not specifically
enforceable in equity. A ease of this sort is Eclipse Oil Company
v. South Penn Oil Co.4 In this case the instrument, which the.
parties termed a lease, purported to grant to the lessee the exclusive right of searching for and producing oil and gas on a certain
tract of land, for a term of three years and as long thereafter as
oil or gas could be produced in paying quantities. The grantor
was to have one-eighth of the petroleum produced and saved by
the grantee, and two hundred dollars per annum for each gas
well during the time gas therefrom should be utilized off of the
premises. Among the further provisions were the following:
"The parties of the second part agree to drill one test well
on the above described premises within six months from the
execution of this lease, or, in lieu thereof, thereafter pay to the
said party of the first part one dollar per acre per annum until
such well is completed; and if said test well is not completed
within six months from the above date, or rentals paid thereon,
39See Dietz v. Mission Transfer Co., 95 Cal. 92, 30 Pac. 380 (1892) ; Chartiers
Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 38 0. Cir. Ct. 106 (1913) aff'd In 88 0. St. 594, 106 N. E.
1053 (1915).

4oWIlliams v. Morrison, 32 Fed. 177 (1887); Wheeler v. West, 71 Cal. 126, 11
Pac. 871 (1886) ; Barksdale v. Hairston, 81 Va. 764 (1886).
See BARNINGER AND
ADAms, THE LAW OF MINES AND MINING, 67-74.
"47 W. Va. 84, 34 S. D. 923 (1899).
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this lease is null and void, and not further binding on either
party. And it is further agreed that the second parties, their
heirs and assigns, shall have the right at any time to surrender
up this lease, and be released from all moneys due and conditions unfulfilled; then and from that time this lease and
agreement shall be null and void, and no longer binding on
either party, and payments which have been made held by the
first party as the full stipulated damages for the nonfulfillment
of the foregoing contract."
There was no consideration mentioned other than the covenants
and agreements in the instrument. After a year had elapsed, during which time the grantee had not entered under the lease, or paid
anything to the grantor, the latter made a second lease to another
party and the first grantee brought a suit in equity to enforce his
rights under his lease. The court held the lease was terminable
at any time by either party because the grantee had the right to
surrender at any time and be released from all moneys due and
from all obligations to come due, and therefore the lease created
only a tenancy at will, for, since it was at the will of one party it
was at the will of both. In this the court erred because a lease
for a term of three years with an option in the lessee to terminate
at any time does not create a tenancy at will.42 If we assume it
was a tenancy at will then such tenancy had been terminated by
the assignment made by the original lessees, H. J. and J. C. Stoze,
to the complainant, the South Penn Oil Company, a point which
the court failed to note.4 , But if, as is frequently stated by the
West Virginia Court, an oil and gas lessee gets no vested interest
in the land until he actually discovers oil or gas,4" then the lessee
in the above case was a party to an alleged contract under which
4'The court relied on the principle that a lease at the will of the lessee is also
at the will of the lessor. This erroneous principle has since been repudiated in subsequent cases. Wilson v,.Reserve Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E. 1075 (1916) ;
South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. 'Va. 438. 76 S. E. /961 (1913) ; Lowther
Oil Co. v. Guffey, 52 W. Va. 88, 43 S. E. 101 (1903).
See TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND
TENANT, 101-104. The court distinguished these latter cases from Eclipse Oil Co. v.
South Penn Oil Co., supra, on the ground that a consideration was paid by the
lessee while there was none in Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co. How can a
lessee under a void lease who has not entered on the land be a tenant at will?
How can one have a tenancy at will where the lease passes only an incorporeal right,
even If the lessee enters? The fact is an oil and gas lease does not create the
relation of landlord and tenant such as exists under an ordinary lease, hence the
difficulty of applying the principles of the law of landlord and tenant.
13A tenant at will has no assignable interest. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 141.
"State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 88 (1896); Kilcoyne v.
Southern Oil Co., 61 W. Va.. 538, 56 S. E. 888 (1907); Steelsmith -v.Gartlin,
45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (1898) ; Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W, Va. 531,
64 S. E. 836 (1909).
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he had done nothing and had not bound himself to do anything.
In such case the alleged contract would not be binding on the
other party, and, the result would be, the lessee would have a mere
license to enter on the land and search for and produce oil and
gas, good until revoked by the lessor. Hence if we take as settled
law the oft expressed view that the lessee gets no vested interest
in the land prior to discovery of oil or gas,45 then in cases like this
there would be only a license in the lessee. If we assume, as the
West Virginia court did, that this was an attempt to make a lease,
and further assume that the authorities are correct which say that
a consideration is necessary to a valid lease,4 then this attempted
lease having no valid consideration would be void and the grantee
would have a mere license to enter and drill for oil and gas. But
is a consideration essential to a lease? Respectable authority says
that it is not and that a lease is primarily a grant of an interest
in land, though it usually contains various covenants, and that a
valid contract, in the sense in which we use the word, is not essential to the passing of the estate under the conveyance. 47 This
seems to be the better view and if correct, then the court erred in
treating this instrument as a bare contract. It might be suggested
that it was not an attempt to create a lease but an attempt to
create a profit. If this was the ease then it would certainly seem.
there is no excuse for holding a consideration is necessary to the
creation of a profit in land, and the court would be the more clearly
wrong in treating this instrument as if a valid contractual consideration were necessary. It follows that the grantee gets more
than a mere license under such an instrument unless one either
adopt the doctrine that an oil and gas lessee gets no vested estate in
land until discovery of oil or gas (which is unsound) or say. a
consideration is necessary to the creation of a valid lease, if it is an
attempt to create a lease, or of a valid profit, if it is an attempt to
create a profit. There are a few cases involving similar leases. 48
In Cortelyou v. Barnsdall and Mitchlol v. Probst49 the so-called
OFor other cases to this effect see 25 W. VA. L. Q. 33.
"See UNDERILL, LANDLORD AND TENANT, 240; 24 Cyc. 877.
A7See TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, 159-165 where the question as to whether
a consideration is essential to the creation of a tenancy Is discussed at length, See
also TAYLOR, LANDLORD AND TENANT, 12.
'sDavis v. Riddle, 25 Colo. App. 162, 136 Pac. 551 (1913); Mitchell V. Probst
152 Pac. 597 (1915) ; CorteIyou v. Barnsdall, 236 Ill. 138, 86 N. E. 200 (1908);
See Stahl V.
Allegheny Oil Co. v. Bradford Oil Co., 21 Hun (N. Y.) 26 (1880).
Van Vleck, 53 0. St. 136, 41 N.'E .35 (1895).
"9See note 48.
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lease was treated as a mere option which would become binding on
the lessee's drilling a well or paying delay rental. This is as unsound as the view taken by the West Virginia court. An option
contract is valid and enforceable; but if there is no consideration
there is no option contract, hence there could be no more than an
offer to make a lease. Needless to say an offer is not an option contract. If there is a mere unilateral offer to make a lease which can
be accepted by drilling a well or paying delay rental, then clearly
the lessee would have a mere license to enter; but in the last mentioned cases such was not the intent of the parties as shown by the
language of the instrument.
It appears, therefore, that nearly all the oil and gas cases wherein
it is said the lessee has a mere license are cases wherein such lessee
has a vested right to enter on the land to search for oil and gas
and a right to take them if found. Whatever the nature of this
right to search for oil and gas, it is certainly not a license. Probably there are no oil and gas cases which involve true licenses. Certainly cases like Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co. do not,
unless one of the questionable doctrines mentioned above be
adopted.
2. PROFITS
As was previously stated, nearly all the oil and gas leases which
have come before the courts have been construed to pass to the
grantee an incorporeal right in the land. In a jurisdiction where
the landowner does not own the oil and gas in place, but has only
a right to reduce them to possession, he has merely an incorporeal
right in the oil and gas in place and consequently could convey to
the grantee only an incorporeal right. In West Virginia and
Kansas, where the grantor is able to grant a corporeal interest in
the oil and gas beneath the surface of his land, it is nevertheless
held that the grantee under an oil and gas lease gets only an incorporeal interest in the land. 0 The relatively few cases in which
a grantee has been held to have acquired a corporeal interest in
the land will be discussed in a subsequent portion of this paper.
Since the grantee under an oil and gas lease gets an incorporeal
interest in the land, is this a leasehold estate or is it an estate of
another kind? In proceeding to answer this question it will be well
to set out a common form of oil and gas lease and note the nature
of the.interest that should pass to a grantee under it.
BOSee note 17, supra.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1918

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1918], Art. 3
WEST

7IRGINIA

LAW

QUARTERLY

Agreement made the first day of June, A. D., 1912, by and between John Doe, etc., party of the first part, and Richard Roe,
party of the second part.
WITNESSETH, that the said party of the first part, for and in
consideration of the sum of One Dollar to him in hand well and
truly paid by the said party of the second part, the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, and of the covenants and agreements hereinafter contained on the part of the said party of the
second part, to be paid, kept, and performed, has granted, demised, leased and let, and by these presents does grant, demise,
lease and let unto the said party of the second part, his heirs and
assigns, for the sole and only purpose of mining and operating for
oil and gas, and of laing pipe lines, and of building tanks, stations and structures thereon to take care of the said products, ALL
that land situated in (here follows the description of the land).
Containing eighty acres, more or less, reserving, however, therefrom three hundred feet around the buildings now on the premises
on which no well shall be drilled by either party except by mutual
consent.
It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for the term of
ten years and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is
produced in paying quantities from the said land by the said party
of the second part, his heirs and assigns.
In consideration of the premises the said party of the second
part covenants and agrees: 1st, to deliver to the credit of the first
party, his heirs and assigns, free of cost in the pipe line to which
the party of the second part may connect his wells, the equal oneeighth part of all the oil produced and saved from the leased
premises; and 2nd, to pay Fifty Dollars ($50) each three months
for the gas from each and every gas well drilled on said premises,
the product from which is marketed and used off the premises;
said payment to be made on each and every well within sixty days
after commencing to use the gas therefrom, as aforesaid, and to
be paid each three months thereafter while the gas from said well
is so marketed and used.
Second party covenants and agrees to locate all wells so as to
interfere as little as possible with the cultivated portions of the
farm. And further, to complete a well on the said premises within
one year from the date hereof, or to pay at the rate of Twenty
Dollars ($20) quarterly in advance, for each additional three
months such completion is delayed from the time above mentioned
for the completion of such well until a well is completed; and it is
agreed that the completion of such well shall be and operate as a
full liquidation of all rental .under this provision during the remainder of the term of this lease.
It is agreed that the second party shall have the privilege of
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using sufficient water and gas from the said premises to run all
machinery necessary for drilling and operating thereon, and at any
time to remove all machinery and fixtures placed on said premises;
and further, upon the payment of Five Dollars ($5) at any time,
by the party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, to the party
of the first part, his heirs and assigns, said party of the second part,
his successors and assigns shall have the right to surrender this
lease for cancellation, after which all payments and liabilities thereafter to accrue under and by virtue of its terms shall cease and
determine, and this lease shall become absolutely null and void.
In WITNESS WHEREOF the parties to this agreement have
hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above
written.
Two or three clauses not material to this discussion are omitted
from the above form of lease. This lease purports to grant to the
grantee the land described therein, "for the sole and only purpose
of mining and operating for oil and gas," for a term of ten years
and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities by the grantee. As usually construed by the courts, this language gives the grantee no greater rights than if the instrument had
purported to grant to him merely the right to mine and operate
for oil and gas." It is held that since it appears that the sole and
only purpose of the lease is to secure the development of the land
for oil and gas, the grantee in either case gets merely a right to
search for oil and gas and to produce such minerals if he finds
them.
On principle what is the nature of the rights acquired by a
grantee under such an oil and gas lease? For the present we will
leave out of consideration the effect of the various covenants in the
lease which follow the habendum. It will appear later that such
covenants do not affect the general nature of the estate granted.
On execution of the lease there would pass at once to the grantee
the right to enter on the land and explore for oil and gas and this
right may last for ten years. If the exploration is successful, the
grantee has a right to produce oil and gas during the unexpired
portion of the ten year period, if any, whether such production is
in paying quantities or not, for the term is ten years and the lease
would not terminate merely because the grantee chose to produce
oil or gas at a loss. The completion of a dry well, or of a well
which produced oil or gas in quantities insufficieiit to pay the cost
51311lls v. Hartz, 77 Kan. 218, 94 Pac. 143 (1908) ; Beardsley V. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 78 Kan. 571, 96 Pac. 859 (1908) ; Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N. Y. 501, 62
N. E. 534 (1902) ; Toothman v. Courtney, 62 W. Va. 167, 58 S. E. 915 (1907).
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of production, would end the obligation of the grantee to pay delay rental under the above lease, but the lease would continue in
force during the remainder of the term, particularly if the grantee
continued his efforts to produce oil and gas in paying quantities.
In order to continue the lease beyond the term fixed it is necessary
that the grantee be producing 'oil or gas in paying quantities at
the time of the termination of the ten-year period. The lease will
then continue so long as he is able to continue such production.
The continuance of the term b'yond the ten-year period is therefore subject to a condition prec.,dent, namely, the discovery of oil
or gas in paying quantities within the ten-year period and the
ability of the grantee to conti ue the production of oil or gas in
paying quantities after the end of such period. The extension of
the lease beyond the fixed term will not take place merely because
oil or gas is produced in paying quantities at some time during
the ten-year term. A grantee inight produce oil in paying quantities during the first five year I of the term and the flow of oil
might cease before the term e. pired. The production in paying
quantities must continue beyond the termination of the fixed period.
It appears, therefore, that, as isoon as the lease is executed the
grantee secures an immediate right to enter on the land and
search for oil and gas, and that this right may last for a term of
ten years. He also appears to have a right during this ten-year
period to produce any oil and gas he may be able to secure from
the land even though not produced in paying quantities. If he
succeeds in producing oil or gIs in paying quantities, he has a
right to continue such producti on during the rest of the tei-year
term. After the end of the ten-year term he has a right to continue the production of oil and gas so long as he is able to produce
either of them in paying quan'ities. This right is contingent on
the discovery of oil or gas in paying qauntities and the production
of one or both of the mineral in paying quantities at the time
of the termination of the fixed term.
Some leases provide that th term shall continue for a fixed
period and so long thereafter as!oil or gas may be produced by the
grantee, there being no provisioa that production must be in paying quantities. Under such a blause the only change in the two
estates of the grantee above mentioned is that the right to continue
the lease after the expiration of the fixed term is dependent only
on the mere production of oil or gas even though in quantities insufficient to pay the cost of production. In some leases there is
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no fixed term. In these no-term leases, there is still a period of
time within which the grantee has an exclusive right to search for
oil and gas and, if he finds either of them within that period, he
has a right to produce it under the terms of the lease. Hence the
same two estates in land are present in the grantee under a noterm lease. In such a lease, if the right of search can be extended
for more than twenty-one years by the grantee without the consent of the grantor, the contingent estate may vest too remotely
and the lease would therefore violate the rule against perpetuities.
It may therefore be said that, on principle, as soon as a valid oil
and gas lease is executed, there passes to the grantee a vested right
to search for oil and gas and a contingent right to produce either or
both if discovered.
Let us now note briefly whether the courts in the decided cases
have recognized the interests mentioned above. In dealing with oil
and gas leases it seems that there is a decided tendency on the part
of the courts to pay little attention to the question, what right the
grantor is able to grant. Such an instrument often seems o be
contrued somewhat in the light of what the judges think the
parties ought to have provided, rather than in the light of what
they actually did provide. As a result, there is a great deal of
confusion in judicial reasoning in such decisions, a confusion which
at the present time seems to be increasing. So frequently are inconsistent statements made by the judges that it is necessary to
draw conclusions as to the nature of the interest of the oil and gas
grantee from a large number of cases.
Perhaps the first case in which the two rights of the grantee
above suggested were pointed out was Venture Oil Co. v. Frets.32
The question involved in this case was whether a grantee, who had
made no effort to develop the land for oil and gas for about six
years, had lost his rights under the lease by abandonment. The
court said:
"A vested title cannot ordinarily be lost by abandonment in
a less time than that fixed by the statute of limitations, unless
there is satisfactory proof of an intention to abandon. An oil
and gas lease stands on quite different ground. The title is
inchoate and for purposes of exploration only, until oil is
found. If it is not found no estate vests in the lessee, and his
title, whatever it is, ends when the unsuccessful search is
abandoned. If oil is found then the right to produce it beOn52 Pa. St. 451, 25 At.

732 (1893).
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,comes a vested right, and t e lessee will be protected in exer•cising it in accordance wi the terms and conditions of his
'contract. "
The language above given has, since its publication, become the
favorite quotation of courts when deciding cases involving the nature of the lessee's interest under an oil and gas lease. Unfortunately, in 1893, when this case was decided, the doctrine that
there is an implied condition in such a lease that the lessee explore
for oil and gas with reasonable diligence, for breach of which the
lease may be forfeited, had not yet been developed, a and the
reasoning of the court in respect to the lack of a vested estate
prior to discovery of oil or gas seems to have been in order to
justify a decision that the lessee had abandoned the lease. Other
4
'courts have applied the same reasoning under similar conditions.1
The same result could now be reached on the ground of forfeiture
for breach of the implied cond tion to develop the premises with
reasonable diligence2. If there is a mere contract right prior to
discovery of oil or gas, then it i difficult to see why a substantial
breach of that contract would not justify the lessor in refusing
,further performance without basIng the decision on abandonment.5 0
Certainly failure to develop for over six years would be a substantial breach of contract if it were a mere contract. The fact that
the court deemed it necessary to base the decision on abandonment
seems to indicate a recognition of more than a mere contract right.
It will be noted that in the above quotation there is a distinct
suggestion of two rights in the grantee, namely, a right to explore
I
O'See Brewster v.

Lanyon Zinc Co.,

1 40 Fed.

801

(1905); Gadbury v.

Ohio

&

Indiana Consolidated Natural Illuminating Gas Co., 162 Ind. 9, 67 N. E. 259
(1903) ; Crawford v. Ritchey, 43 W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 220 (1897).
UlFoster v. Elk Fork oil & Gas Co., I10 Fed. 178 (1898); Brookshire Oil Co. v.
'Casmalia Ranch Oil & Development Co., J56 Cal. 211, 103 Pac. 927 (1909) ; Beardsley v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 78 Kan. 571, 96 Pac. 859 (1908) ; Aye v. Philadel-

phia Co., 193 Pa. St. 451, 44 AtI. 555
S. E.

1005

1899) ; Smith v. Root, 66 W. Va. 633, 66

(1910): Parish Fork Oil Co. v.

Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W.

Va. 583,

42 S. E. 655 (1902) ; Steelsmith v. Gartlin, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (1898).
55

In

addition to the cases in note 53

ee Peoples Gas Co. v.

(1911) ; Shannon v. Long, 180 Ala. 128 60 So. 273
-Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S. W. 837 (1911) ; Acme
.140 Cal. 681, 74 Pac. 296 (1903) ; Day v. Kansas
32, 125 Pac. 43 (1912) ; Collins v. Mt.I Pleasant Oil

Dean, 193 Fed. 938

(1912); Mansfield Gas Co. v.
Oil & Mining Co. v. Williams,
City Pipe Line Co., Sq Kan.
& Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, 118

Pac. 54 (1911) ; Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106 Pac. 47
(1909) ; Bay State Petroleum Co. v. Penn Lubricating Co., 121 Ky. 37, 87 S. W.

3102 (1905) ; Conkling v. Krandusky, 112 N. Y. S. 13 (1908) ; Eaton v. Allegany
Gas Co., 122 N. Y. 416, 25 N. E. 981 (1890); Parish Fork Oil & Gas Co. v.
-ridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 4 S. B. 655 (1902). 1
"See Pyle v. Henderson, 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. E. 762 (1909).
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for oil and gas and a right to produce them if found. These two
distinct rights of the oil and gas lessee have subsequently been
recognized by various courts,57 though some of these courts apparently have not considered the first right, the right of exploration,
as a vested interest in the land. This erroneous idea was certainly
derived from the opinion of the court in Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts.
In speaking of these rights the court in the well reasoned opinion
in Lindlay v. Raydure, 8 said:
"It is equally certain that an estate of some character does
vest in him [the lesseeJ in the surface; i. e., the rest of the
land. The owner thereof by virtue of his proprietorship, as
so stated, has the exclusive right thereon to seek to acquire
such substances [oil and gas]. This right may be resolved into
two successive rights; i. e., to explore therefor by drilling
wells, and then, if discovered, to produce them. It is on this
production that they become his. Having such right he can
transfer it, and immediately upon the execution of the transfer an estate in the land vests in the person to whom it is
made, at least so far as the right to explore is concerned. Such
a transfer is effected by such an instrument as I am dealing
with
...
"That an estate in the surface of the land of some character
vests in the lessee immediately upon the execution of the instrument I do not understand to be questioned anywhere. Possibly there is some question as to the exact nature of the estate
which vests; but otherwise there is none .........
..
It
is sufficient for the purpose thereof [of the case under consideration] that an estate in possession to explore for oil and gas
does vest immediately upon the execution of the instrument,
and that an estate in the future to produce oil and gas will
vest on its discovery, whatever limitations or qualifications
either may be subject to."
The court after quoting the language above quoted from the
opinion in Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts continued:
G'Shaffer v. Marks, 241 Fed. 139 (1917) ; Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. {56, 84 N. E. 46
(1908) ; Bruner v. Hicks, 230 Ill.456, 82 N. D. 888 (1907); Heal v. Niagra Oil
Co., 150 Ind. 483, 59 N. E. 492 (1898); Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63
N. U. 490 (1902); Dickey v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co., 69 Kan. 106, 76
Pac. 308 (1904); Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913)
Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, 110 Pac. 902 (1910) ; Glasgow v. Chartiers Oil
Co., 152 Pa. St. 48, 25 AtI. 232 (1892) ; Hefner v. Light, Fuel and Pchwer Co., 77
W. Va. 217, 87 S. E. 206 (1915); South Penn Oil Co. v. Haught, 71 W. Va. 720,
78 S. E. 759 (1913) ; Smith v. Root, "66 W. Va. 633, 66 S. E. 1005 (1910);
Pyle v. Henderson, 65 'W. Va. 39, 63 S. E. 762 (1909) ; Kilcoyne v. Southern Oil
Co., 61 W. Va. 538, 56 S. B. 888 (1907).
t239 Fed. 928, 933-935 (1917).
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"Substantially similar statements will be found in other
eases involving oil and gas leases. It may create the impression that there is nothing vested until oil or gas is found.
Such, however, is not the case and no such thought was intended to be conveyed. What is inchoate until oil or gas is
found is the right to produce oil and gas and the right to the
oil and gas itself, which remains inchoate until produced. The
right to explore, therefore, is at no time inchoate. Itis vested,
and will be protected from the time of the execution of the instrument. "
Probably it is going too far to say that the courts which follow
Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts do not intend what the language seems
to say, namely, that no estate whatever vests in the grantee prior
to discovery of oil or gas. However, a careful reading of the numerous cases cited in the preceding notes will lead to the conviction that the courts now do recognize the fact that the grantee
under an oil and gas lease has a vested interest in the land from the
moment the lease is executed, though inconsistent language is frequently found. Courts of equity specifically enforce oil and gas
leases before discovery of oil or gas, both on the ground that the
9
grantee has no adequate remedy at law and on the ground that
80
These cases necessarily
equity has jurisdiction to restrain waste.
recognize that the grantee has a vested estate in the land as soon as
the lease is executed.
Do the express covenants and conditions so frequently found in
oil and gas leases prevent the passing of these two estates to the
grantee? While the covenants and conditions of oil and gas leases
have at times been given impossible constructions plainly contrary
to the intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the
instrument, there has been no case found where, if the lease is
valid at all, the lessee did not secure the exclusive right to search
59

In many cases courts have proceeded to give relief to the lessee under an oil

and gas lease by injunction or specific performance without any question as to the

jurisdiction of the court of equity being raised. In the following cases it was held
that a court of equity will specifically enforce the covenants of an oil and gas
lease: Shaffer v. Marks, 241 Fed. 139 (1917) ; Gillespie V. Fultqn Oil land Gas Co.,
236 Ill. 188, 86 N. E. 219 (1908) ; Indianapolis Natural Gas Co., v. Kibby, 135
Ind. 357, 35 N. E. 392 (1893) ; American Steel & wire Co. v. Tate, 33 Ind. App.
504. 71 N. E. 189 (1904) ; Smith v. Root, 66 W. Va. 633, 66 S. E. 1005 (1910)
Eastern 011 Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, '64 S. E. 839 (1909).
WThe following cases hold that equity will interfere to restrain waste at the suit
of a grantee under an oil and gas lease who has not entered to begin the development of the property: Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101 (1915) ; Lindlay -V.Raydure,
supra; Logan Gas & Fuel Co. v. Great Southern Gas & Oil Co., 126 Fed. 623 (1903) ;
Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder, 106 Fed. 764 (1900) ; Smith V. Root, 66 W. Va. 633,
66 S. E. 1005 (1910).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol25/iss4/3

24

Simonton: The Nature of the Interest of the Grantee Under an Oil and Gas Le
INTEREST OF OIL AND

GAS GRANTEE

for oil and gas for some fixed period and where, if he should discover oil or gas within such period, the right to produce would not
have vested. The courts in some cases have gone far in implying
covenants and conditions which clog and restrain the right of the
grantee apparently given him by the lease,"' but have seldom questioned the validity of the lease itself or denied the right to search
for oil and gas. Their effort has been to compel the grantee to proeed to explore for oil and gas as soon as possible-to shorten the
time within which the exploration must be made. It therefore appears, both on principle and by weight of authority, that on the
execution of a valid oil and gas lease two estates in the land pass
to the lessee, one of which is a vested right to explore for oil and
gas and the other a right to produce them contingent on discovery
of either of them.
Some of the courts seem to have doubt as to whether an exclusive right to search for oil and gas during a fixed period is an
estate in the land. The right is usually termed "license," "irrevocable license," "right" or "incorporeal right."6 2 It is seldom
called an estate in the land, though that is plainly what it is. 3
Blackstone stated that,14 "An estate in lands, tenements and heri"In some cases oil and gas leases have been given extreme and rather unreasonable constructions which disregard the express language of the parties. See Brown
v. Wilson, 160 Pac. 94 (Okla. 1916) ; Frank oil Co. v. Belleview Oil & Gas Co., 29
Okla. 719, 110 Pac. 260 (1911) ; Witherspoon v. Staley, 156 S. W. 557 (Tex. Civ.
But even in these cases the grantee was held to have a right to exApp. 1913).
plore for oil and gas for a limited term though not for the term indicated by" the
language of the lease.
In a few cases oil and gas leases have been termed unilateral contracts. The
judges who decided these cases apparently had no conception as to the meaning of
the term used but were aware that if the instrument under consideration were a
unilateral contract then it would not be binding on the grantor-the result desired.
6See Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N. E. 490 (1902) ; Hancock V.
Diamond Plato Glass Co., 162 Ind. 146, 70 N. E. 149 (1904) ; Dickey v. Coffeyville
Vitrified Brick & Tile Co., 69 Kan. 106, 76 Pac. 398 (1904); Eastern Oil Co. a,.
McAvoy, 75 Kan. 515, 89 Pac. 1048 (1907) ; Mitchell v. Probst, 152 Pac. 597
(Okla. 1915); Shepard v. McCalmont Oil Co., 38 Hun 37 (N. Y. 1885); Funk v.
Haldeman, 53 Pa. St. 229 (1866); Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 29T
(1869) ; Dark v. "Johnson,55 Pa. St. 164 (1867) ; Thompson's Appeal, 101 Pa. St.
225 (1882) ; Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 839 (1909).
6Courts frequently deny that an oii and gas grantee acquires any estate in land
prior to discovery.
"This court has held In several cases that such a lease creates no estate in the
land, or in the oil or gas which it may contain. It merely creates a license to enter
and explore for oil and gas, and to sever them if found." Per Graves J.,in Beardsley v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 78 Kan. 571, 89 Pac. 859 (1908).
"In this State and in Pennsylvania, such leases are generally treated as mere
licenses vesting no estate, the title thereto, both as to the period of years and the
term thereafter remaining inchoate and contingent on the finding of oil and gas."
Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, supra.
"II Blackstone, 108.
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ditaments signifies such an interest as the tenant hath therein."
In Bouvier's Law Dictionary an estate in land is defined as "the
degree, quantity, nature and extent of interest which a person has
in real property." Other definitions are equally comprehensive,
so that there can be no doubt that a right to enter on land to
search for oil and gas for a fixed period is an estate therein.
Having determined the nature of the interest of the oil and gas
lessee in the land, the next question is as to what this interest
should be termed. It is held that no new kind of estate in real
property can be created and it follows that the interest of the
lessee, as heretofore stated, must be a license, a profit or a leasehold. It has already been shown that the estate is not a license
though it is often erroneously so termed. A leasehold at common
law contemplates a corporeal interest in the land of which the
lessee has the use and occupation and for which he pays a compensation called rent. 5 The lessee has no right to destroy the substance of the soil unless sucJ right be expressly conferred, but has
only the right to use the premises leased. If he takes part of the
soil itself he is guilty of waste. It seems clear, therefore, that the
estate in land which the grantee acquires under an oil and gas lease
is not a leaseheold estate and that the relation of landlord and
tenant does not arise between the parties. 60 The sole object of the
oil and gas lease is to search for and produce oil and gas, a thing
which no tenant would have a right to do without special permission granted in his lease. The grantee under an oil and gas lease
has no rights in the surface of the land except those necessary to
enable him to carry out advantageously the one object of the grant.
These rights in the surface are easements incidental to the grant
of the estate in the land. He does not pay rent for the use and occupation of land but may pay a periodic sum, usually called delay
rental, for the privilege of delaying the exploration for oil and gas
from period to period. If he discovers oil and produces it he
gives to the grantor a share of the oil itself. If he produces gas
'5The question as to whether any of the oil and gas leases are true leases is discussed in a subsequent part of this paper.
cFor expression of opinions that oil and gas leases are not leases see Smith v.
Root, 66 W. Va. 683, 66 S. E. 1005 (1910) ; Eclipse Oil Co. V. South Penn Oil Co.,
47 W. Va. 84, 34 S. E. 923 (1899) ; Lawson v. Kirchner, 50 W. Va. 344, 40 S. E.
344 (1901).
In Lawson v. Kirchner, supr, it was said: "The so-called rental in this case is not
reserved for his enjoyment of the estate as in an ordinary lease of realty. But it is
compensation or commutation money for his right to enjoy it, and at the same time
preventing the plaintiff from conveying the right to the enjoyment thereof to someone else for the stipulated period of two years."
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he usually pays a certain sum each year for each gas well. That
this is not rent is shown by the cases which have arisen between
life tenant and remainderman. The life tenant has a right to lease
the property during his life and to collect and enjoy the rents and
profits therefrom, but he has no right to make an oil and gas lease
nor has he a right to produce oil or gas where no wells existed at
the time his estate vested in possession. 7 Perhaps the same could
8
be said as to the cases involving guardian and ward.6
In these
eases the oil and gas lease is correctly treated as giving the grantee
a right to take something out of the land and not a mere right to
use the land. The royalty paid under an oil and gas lease is not
rent but a compensation for taking something from the soil."'
Since an instrument like that quoted above is popularly termed
a lease, courts have often assumed that a tenancy was created and
have tried to treat the parties as if they were landlord and tenant,
frequently with unsatisfactory results. For example, when the
leased premises are severed and the portions pass to different men
an attempt has been made to apportion the royalty as rent is apportioned when the reversion is severed.7 0 If the lease is void for
some reason, it has been held the grantee becomes a tenant at
will, though he has never entered.71 The statutes in some states
to the effect that a lease for an indefinite term shall be considered
a lease from year to year have been applied to oil and gas leases,
7
though plainly inapplicable. 2
OShultis v. MacDougal, 162 Fed. 331 (1907); Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 1761 Ind.
4, 95 N. B. 225 (1911) ; Richmond Natural Gas Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ind. App. 25,
76 N. E. 25 (1905); Gerkins v. Kentucky Oil Co., 100 Ky. 734k 39 S. W. 444
(1897) ; Marshall v. MIellon, 179 Pa. St. 371, 36 At. 201 (1897) ; Keen v. Bartlett,
41 W. Va. 559, 23 S. E. 664 '(1895) ; Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E.
411 (1897) ; Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781 (1897).
egThough a guardian may have power to lease his ward's lands without an order
of court he cannot make a valid oil and gas lease. Ammons v. Ammons, 50 W. Va.
390, 40 S. E. 490 (1901) ; Haskell v. Sutton, 53 W. Va. 206, 44 S. E. 533 (1903).
69While it is true the lessee for agricultural purposes by farming the land does
destroy the substance of the soil in some neasure, historically this has been regarded as a use of the land. Furthermore, it is possible by the use of good husbandry to keep up perpetually the fertility of the soil.
7OSee Wetengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. St. 559, 28 At. 934 (1894); Campbell v.
Lynch, 94 S.
. 739 (W. Va. 1918).
71
Eclipse Oil Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 84, 34 S. E. 923 (1899);
Cowan v Radford Iron Co., 83 Va. 1347, 3 S. E. 120 (1887).
72Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. Curless, 22 Ind. App. 346, 52 N. E. 782 (1899);
Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. Eshelberger, 24 Ind. App. 124, 55 N. E. 233 (1899).
These cases were subsequently overruled by Hancock v. Diamond Plate Glass Co., 162
Ind. 146, 70 N. B. 149 (1904).
In this case the court said:
"We are unable to see how the principles pertaining to the relation of landlord
and tenant are applicable to such a contract as the one before us, either where
possession has or has not been taken under the contract."
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It is apparent that the oil and gas lease creates a profit a prendre
and not a leasehold estate. In speaking of profits a prendre Blackstone says :73
"A common of turbary is a liberty of digging turf upon
another's ground. There is also a common of digging for coals,
minerals, stones and the like. All these bear a resemblance to
common of pasture in many respects; though in one point they
go much further: common of pasture being only a right of
feeding on the herbage and vesture of the soil, which renews
annually; but common of turbary, and the rest, are a right of
carrying away the very soil itself."
Even in Blackstone's day the character of a profit was well
recognized though this class of estates in land was probably neither
common nor important prior to the time of the modern mineral
leases. Since the interest of the grantee under very many of these
mining leases is a profit a prendre the estate has now become of
much importance. Perhaps the fact that profits a prendre were
neither common nor of great value, for such a long period is one
explanation as to why courts today seem so reluctant frankly to
term an estate a profit. It may be suggested that at common law
profits a prendre were fee simple estates, but both upon principle
74
and authority a profit may be for life or for years, as well as in
fee simple. Consequently, the fact that an oil and gas lease may
be for a term of years does not mean that the grantee's interest
is not a profit.
The ultimate object of the oil and gas lease is to develop the land
in order to secure these minerals. Title to the minerals passes to
75
the grantee only when he reduces them to possession, another
characteristic of a profit. The grantee has a right to take something of value from the soil, that is, oil or gas or both. Under the
law of West Virginia and Kansas he takes a part of the soil itself
just as truly as in the case of a profit in solid minerals. As we
have seen in most jurisdictions the law is that the owner of the land
does not own the oil and gas underneath such land. Does this
prevent the estate of the grantee from being a profit? It is submitted that it does not, for the grantee nevertheless has a right to
take something of value from the soil not in the nature of crops.
73I Blackstone, 34.
"Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838
206, 210 (1866).
7See cases cited in note 9.

(1845) ; Huff v. McCauley,
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Such a right in some degree resembles the right to take percolating
waters from the soil, a right which the early courts held to be an
easement and which is still so considered. Such a right to take
water is really a profit and probably no court which did not con76
sider itself bound by authority would now hold it an easement.
The term of the oil and gas lease set out above is for ten years
and as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced by the lessee in
paying quantities. Does this create in the grantee an incorporeal
estate for years or does it create an incorporeal hereditament?
There are some decisions where it is asserted, without giving any
very convincing reasons, that the estate of the grantee is not a
freehold estate. 77 On the other hand, some decisions hold that
the estate is a freehold estate-an incorporeal hereditamentthis being the established law in Illinois.7
The courts of that
state hold that since the interest of the grantee may last for an
indefinite time, it is a freehold estate. It must be admitted that
there is much to be said for this view. It is certainly very difficult to argue that an estate which will continue as long as oil or
gas can be produced in paying quantities is an estate for years.
In most of the cases it has not been necessary to adjudicate this
question.
That the ordinary oil and gas lease does create a profit a prondre
has been recognized by at least one standard text book on real
property.7 9 Some cases correctly term the estate a profit a prendre. 8 0 lany cases state that such a lease creates an incorporeal
right in the land."' This term is not incorrect but it is not so desirable as the former term because its meaning is too broad. Recognition of the estate as a profit a prendre would be of great assistance
in getting away from the idea that there is a real tenancy created
"'While the right to take water from the land of another is held to be an easement a right to take ice seems to be regarded as a profit. Mitchell v. D'Olier, 68
N. J. L. 375, 53 Atl. 467 (1902) : Huntington v. Asher, 96 N. Y. 604 (1884).
7TBrown v. Wilson, 160 Pac. 94 (Okla. 1916); State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42
W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896).
7
8Eastern Oil Co. v. McAvoy, 75 Kan. 515, 89 Pac. "1048 (1907) ; Martin v. Springfield Crude Oil Co., 77 Kan. 851, 92 Pac. 1119 (1907) ; Bruner v. Hicks, 230 I1.
456, 82 N. E. 888 (1907) : Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E.
53 (1908) ; Funk v. Haldeman, 52 Pa. St. 229 (1866) ; Thompson's 'Appeal, 101 Pa.
St. 225 (1882); Southern Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 292, 69 S. W. 169
(1902).
7
0Seo TIFFANy, REAL PaoPEERy, 745. See also 31 HARV. L. REV. 882; 58 U. PA.
L. REV. 16.

8Campbell vi. Smith, 180 Ind. 159, 101 N. E. 89 (1913) ; Martin V. Springfield
Crude Oil Co., 77 Kan. 851, 92 Pac. 1119 (1907) ; Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. St.
2291 (1866).
mSee cases cited in notes 54 and 57. most of which support this statement.
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by an oil and gas lease and the consequent attempts to apply principles of the law of landlord and tenant not properly applicable.
Any attempt to apply the rules of law which have grown up in
connection with the relation of landlord and tenant, where the
estate is corporeal, to an incorporeal estate such as a profit, can only
result in confusion and uncertainty in a large number of cases.
It is desirable to apply some of the principles of the law of landlord
and tenant to cases arising out of oil and gas leases and leases for
the mining of solid minerals. It is not desirable to apply all of the
principles of the law of landlord and tenant to mineral leases, because many of such principles are inapplicable to a profit a prendre.
So long as our courts continue to call these instruments leases
there will be attempts to apply these inapplicable principles to oil
and gas leases, because some courts, without due consideration, will
assume that they are leases and that settled principles applicable
to leases must therefore be applied to them.
If the fact that an oil and gas lease creates a profit a prendre
were universally established, how could the application of the desirable rules of landlord and tenant to these interests be justified?
Though the profit a prendre is an estate which has been known to
the law for centuries there has been so little litigation concerning
it that the questions which constantly arise in the mining law
cases as to the effect of covenants and conditions and the like attached to such estates are entirely unsettled except in so far as
settled in mining cases where the estate involved has not been
recognized as a profit. Hence the courts are left free to choose
those rules of law which seem properly applicable to profits and
to disregard those which cannot logically apply to an incorporeal
interest such as a profit. For example, there seems to be no good
reason why the analogy to landlord and tenant is not sufficiently
close to justify the application of the law as to assignment of
leases or of the law as to covenants running with leasehold estates
to profits a prendre, and in fact it is settled that such principles of
law should be applied though in cases where it was assumed the relation of landlord and tenant existed.82 On the other hand, the
8See Hefner v. Light, Fuel & Power Co., 77 W. Va. 217, 87 S. E. 206 (1915);
Castle Brook Carbon Black Co. v. Ferrell, 76 V. Va. 300, 8M1S. E. 544 (1915)
Montgomery v. lickok, 188 Ill. App. 348 (1914); Ardizzonne v. Archer, 160 Pac.
446 (Okla. 1916); Indiana Gas & Oil Co. v. Hinton. 159 Ind. 398, 46 N. E. 224
(1902) ; Aikin v. Marshall Oil Co., 188 Pa. St. 602, 41 Atl. 748 (1898) ; Chandler v.
Hart, 161

Cal. 405,

119

Pac. 516

(1911) ; McGoodwin

v.

Lusterine Mining and.

Polishing Co., 110 S. W. 409 (Ky. 1908).
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right of a landlord to distrain for rent in arrears cannot be applied to ordinary mineral leases. It is desirable that the court in
each case involving an oil and gas lease should feel free to consider whether or not a particular principle is properly applicable to such a profit a prendre without danger of erroneously considering itself bound by authority to apply some particular principle of the law of landlord and tenant. Without definitely
recognizing oil and gas leases as profits, courts have already gone
far in selecting the rules of law as to landlord and tenant which
ought to apply to the situation arising under oil and gas leases but
there would be far less confusion and inconsistency had they been
treated as profits from the beginning.
3. LEASES
By the law of most jurisdictions the landowner has no interest
in the oil and gas in place beneath his land which can be the subject of a lease giving the lessee a corporeal interest in the oil and
gas. Hence it would seem that a true lease for the purpose of mining for oil and gas would be impossible. But in two or three jurisdictions oil and gas leases have in some cases been held to give the
lessee a corporeal estate in the land.8 3 It is submiteed that these
cases are unsound. In West Virginia and Kansas, where the owner
of land has title to oil and gas in place, the courts have held that
under the usual lease forms the grantee gets no corporeal right in
4
the land, a conclusion which appears to be sound.1
In the case of Brown v. Fowler85 the lease purported to demise
all the oil and gas in and under the land "and also the said tract of
land for the purpose and with the exclusive right of operating
thereon for said oil and gas." The court said this created a corporeal interest in the land. The idea apparently is that the corporeal interest consists of 'a right to the possession of the land so
far as is necessary to mine for oil and gas. It will be noted that
8KIine v. Guaranty Oil Co., 167 Cal. 476, 140 Pac. 1 (1914); Shenk V. Stahl,
35 Ind. App. 493, 74 N. E. 538 (1905) ; Columbia Gas & Fuel Co. v. Knox County
Oil & Gas Co., 91 0. St. 369, 109 N. E. 529 (1914); Brown v. Fowler, 65 0. St.
507, 63 N. H. 76 (1902) ; Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 0. St. 118, 48 N. E. 502 (1897) ;
Woodland Oil Co. ", Crawford, 55 0. St. 161, 44 N. E. 1093 (1896) ; Stahl v. Van
Vleck, 53 0. St. 136, 41 N. E. 35 (1895); McKean Natural Gas Co. -V. Wolcott,
254 Pa. St. 323, 98 Atl. 955 (1916); Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. St.
338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909).
slDickey v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co., 69 Kan. 106, 76 Pac. 398 (1904)
State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896); Toothman v.
Courtney, 62 W. Va. 167, 58 S. E. 915 (1907).
-65 0. St. 507, 63 N. E. 76 (1902).
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this is what the grantee would have by implication if such right
were not expressly granted. Nothing is paid for the surface of the
land and the use is incidental to the grant of the right to search
for and produce oil and gas. It would seem that the instrument
created only a profit.
In Pennsylvania the courts have attempted to formulate a distinction between those oil and gas leases which pass corporeal interests and those which pass mere incorporeal rights in the land.
It has been said that if the instrument purports to grant the land,
together with the right to mine for oil and gas thereon, as distinguished from a grant of the mere right to go on the land and
mine for oil and gas, then a corporeal estate passes to the grantee.8 6 Some of the difficulties in applying such a doctrine are illustrated in Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co.,8 7 where the court, in
holding that the lessee could maintain ejectment though he had
never entered to explore for oil or gas, said:
"The language of the agreement in the case at bar shows it
to be a lease, conveying an interest in land, a corporeal and
not an incorporeal hereditament. The lessor does, in the
language of the lease, 'grant, demise, lease and let unto the
all that certain tract of
said party of the second part ......
for the sole
land ......
containing one hundred acres ......
and only purpose of mining and operating for oil, gas and
other minerals and of laying pipe lines and of building tanks,
stations and structures thereon to take care of the said products.' It will be seen, by this transposition of the language
of the lease, that the land itself is granted and demised, and
not simply the right to enter upon and prospect and operate
for oil or gas. It is not simply a privilege given to the lessee
to use the premises for mining purposes but the land itself is
demised with the right to obtain the minerals thereon. By the
agreement the exclusive right to take and appropriate all the
minerals is conveyed and during the.term of the lease the lessor
has no right to enter and operate for oil or gas. The title to
the oil except the one-eighth thereof is vested in the lessee, as
is also the title to the gas and other minerals in the land.
Under the rule of construction established, not only in other
jurisdictions, but by our own cases, therefore, the agreement
creates a corporeal interest in the lessee in the demised premises, and is not merely a license to enter and operate for oil
and gas."
In order to sustain the finding that a corporeal interest passed
s"Kelly v. Keys, 213 Pa. St. 295, 62 At!. 911 (1906).
87225 Pa. St. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909).
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to the lessee the court in the above case overruled such cases as
Westmnoreland Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt s and Kelly v. Keys8 9
and apparently established the doctrine that the landowner has
title to the oil and gas in place beneath his land and can convey
such title to others. It is difficult to see why any court should make
any effort to establish a corporeal estate in the grantee. The remedy in equity is certainly sufficient to enable him to protect his
rights effectively and no right to maintain ejectment is necessary.
Certainly the rights of an oil and gas grantee can be adequately
protected only in a court of equity. It is submitted there should be
no distinction drawn in this respect between a lease like that in
Kelly v. Keys and the one in Barns(dall v. Bradford Gas Co. and
that the decision in the latter case is not sound.
In Indiana there are a number of decisions involving oil and gas
leases, which, judging from the language used, appear more like
true leases than the ones involved in the above cases. The leases
involved in these Indiana cases expressly demise a certain area of
land around each well site and yet the courts of that state have
held that the lessee gets no corporeal right in the-land. 0
If an instrument actually does give to the lessee the right to the
possession and use of the land with the added right of mining for
oil and gas thereon, then no doubt there -would be a true lease with
a profit attached. But it is doubtful if it was the intent of the
parties to any of the instruments involved in the cases cited above
to give to the grantee any more than an exclusive privilege of mining for oil and gas. No right to farm the land or to use it for any
other purpose than that of the production of oil and gas appears to
be granted nor does any case appear where the grantee has claimed
greater rights. It is submitted that any oil and gas lease in which
the intent is to confer only the right to explore for and produce
oil and gas should not be construed to pass a corporeal interest in
the land and cannot be a true lease.
CONCLUSION
The primary object of an oil and gas lease is to secure the exploration and development of the leased premises for oil and gas and
therefore the grantee is given the right to enter on the land to ex6See note 3.
"'See note 82.
QOSee Hancock v. Diamond Plate Glass Co., 162 Ind. 146, 70 N. E. 149, (1904)
Diamond Plate Glass Co. v. Knote, 38 Ind. App. 20, 77 N. E. 954 (1906).
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plore for oil and gas and the right to produce them if found by
him. As soon as the instrument is executed the right to explore
for oil and gas on the premises passes to and vests in the grantee
while the right to produce oil and gas is contingent on the discovery of oil or gas by the grantee. These two rights are necessarily incorporeal estates in the land. The grantee under an oil
and gas lease has a right to enter on the premises subject to the
lease, and to occupy so much of the surface thereof as is necessary
to enable him effectively to prosecute a search for oil and gas and
to produce them if he is successful in finding them. These rights
to use the surface of the premises are rights which, in the absence
of express language, pass to the grantee by implication as incidental
to the grant of the right to search and the right to produce. They
are therefore easements appurtenant to the right to search and the
right to produce. If these rights in the surface of the land are expressly granted in the lease they are still easements appurtenant
and will continue only until the object of the lease is accomplished.
If it be true that the grantee under an oil and gas lease gets no
more than the incorporeal right to explore for oil and gas and the
incorporeal right to produce them if found, then it follows that an
oil and gas lease is not a true lease but is a grant of a profit in the
land and ought to be so designated. The use of the term "lease"
by the courts is unfortunate because it leads to many unsatisfactory
decisions growing out of attempts by courts to treat oil and gas
leases as true leases and to apply to them the settled principles of
landlord and tenant. If these instruments were recognized as
grants of profits the courts would feel free to select and apply to
them such of the principles of the law of landlord and tenant as
seem desirable and to reject those which are not properly applicable. The result would be a more logical and satisfactory body of
law relating to this important field. Perhaps the most important
function of decisions of courts of last resort is to furnish rules for
guidance of the people in future transactions. Judging from the
opinions rendered in the country during the past two or three years
involving oil and gas leases, the most learned lawyers cannot advise a course of conduct as to rights arising under an oil and gas
lease with any reasonable confidence as to the value of such advice.
It is submitted that much of the undesirable confusion in the law
as to oil and gas leases has resulted from the unwarranted assumption that these instruments are true leases.
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